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Comments and Casenotes
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS IN
STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS
By H. RuTHmEFoRD TURNBULL III
I. INTRODUCTION

In establishing in Gideon v. Wainwright' the Fourteenth
Amendment right of indigent state court defendants to
court-appointed counsel in non-capital cases, overruling
Betts v. Brady,2 the Supreme Court discarded one of its
most criticized decisions and progressed yet another step in
applying to the states one of the rights and immunities specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights against Federal
violation. Gideon is noteworthy not only because it illustrates the history of the overruling of a bad precedent, but
also because it serves as an example of an evolving concept
of federal-state relations. It represents another resolution
of the constitutional conflict between the preservation of
individual rights and the reservation of power to the states
to expediently enforce the criminal law. Finally, it can be
interpreted as another piecemeal victory for those members
of the Supreme Court whose judicial activism is summed up
in the doctrine of "absorption" of the specific guarantees
of the first eight amendments against Federal action into
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause over those
whose judicial self-restraint caused them to refuse to depart
from Betts v. Brady and further reduce state control of
criminal procedure. Beneath these microcosmic views of
Gideon run the persuasive forces of history and of the 1932
case of Powell v. Alabama5 So forcefully does Gideon resort to them that they must be examined and understood
if Gideon is to take on full meaning in the stream of cases
and the scheme of law.
II. ISmTOcIAL CONSmERATIONS
At the outset, it is important to recall the distinction between the right to counsel of one's own choosing and the
right to court-appointed counsel. In discussing the latter
1372 U.S. 335; 153 So. 2d 299 (1963), case on remand from the Supreme
Court.
'316 U.S. 455 (1942). Both Betts and Gideon were charged with felonies,
a factor which could be a basis for limiting Gideon to felony cases only.
s287 U.S. 45 (1932).

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1963]

right, the Court has borrowed language, essentially dicta,
from opinions which involved the right to counsel of one's
own choosing, and has used the language to support a finding of a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process by
the trial court's failure to appoint counsel for the defendant.
This blending of cases, basically different in their nature
but commonly related to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is evident in Gideon's reliance on Powell, as will be
indicated below. Further, it is important to note that
Gideon found that Betts' historical approach was "wrong"
in its basic premise that "the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights,"4 and that
Gideon found "ample precedent", especially Powell, existed
to uphold a contrary view.
As early as the 13th Century,5 a defendant enjoyed the
right to have counsel of his own choosing represent him on
questions of law, such as exceptions to an indictment,' and
in the 16th Century, he had a similar right in appealing a
felony conviction.7 In subsequent years, the restriction on
the right of counsel to appear only when questions of law
were raised, as distinguished from questions of fact, was
preserved.' The limitation of the right was justified on
two grounds: (1) the canon law principle that the prosecution would make its case so plain that it would be useless
to look at any evidence to the contrary,' and (2) the assumption that the court would protect the defendant's
rights."0 The right was further restricted as the degree and
seriousness of the alleged crime increased, 1 the Crown
thereby preserving an12 obvious advantage in all serious
criminal prosecutions.
S upra, n. 1, 342; see also Becker and Heidelbaugh, The Right to Counsel
in Criminal Cases, 28 Notre Dame L. 351 (1953).
'I POLLOCx AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (Lawyers' Literary
Club Ed., 1959) 211.
I COOLEY, CONSTrruTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th Ed., 1890) 403-7.
SAINT GERMAIN,

THE DOOTOR AND THE STUDENT

(Muchall's Ed., 1874)

256-9.
a COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS

(Brooke Ed., 1797) 29, 334, 136-7, 230; II HAWKINS,
(1824) 554; II HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE 'PLTES OF
Ed., 1847) 236; Becker and Heidelbaugh, supra, n. 4,
SIII COKE, INSTITUTES, op. cit. supra, n. 8, 29; II
OF THE UNITED STATES

OF ENGLAND

PLEAS OF THE CROWN
THE CROWN (1st Am.

354, 356.
STORY, CONSTITUTION

(4th Ed., 1873) 549-550.

S1II STORY, op. cit. supra, n. 9, 550; IV BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
(1898) 335, Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949). See also Becker and
Heidelbaugh, supra, n. 4, 354, 356, Fellman, The Constitutional Right to
Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 Neb. L. R. 559, 560 (1951).
n.BEANET, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS

1955) 8.
, I CooLEY, op. cit. supra, n. 6, 405.

(U.

Mich. Press,
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By the Treason Act of 1695,"3 Parliament began to equalize the power of the Crown and of the defendant by guaranteeing the right to employ counsel and the right to request court-appointed counsel in cases of misprison of treason and treason. In 1747, the Parliament granted the same
rights in cases of impeachment for treason. 4 In 1836, the
right to retain counsel in all criminal trials was finally
given a statutory basis. 5 Thereafter, in 1903, the Poor
Prisoners' Defense Act left it to the court's discretion
whether to appoint counsel in all felony cases;' 6 in 1930, a
similarly entitled statute required court-appointed counsel
in all murder cases;' 7 and finally in 1949 the Legal Aid and
Advice Act permitted appointment of counsel before arraignment but conditioned the right upon the court's discretion and the defendant's request.'"
Although there is controversy over the relative influence
of English common law in its substantive and procedural
aspects upon the American colonies, it seems clear that,
before the Constitution was adopted, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia and Rhode Island had statutory provisions more liberal than England's;19 that the other
colonies at least in practice borrowed the English procedure
relating to the right to privately-employed counsel;" and
that most state constitutions preserved the right to counsel
of one's own choosing in one form or another.2 ' Along with
Massachusetts,22 Maryland improved on the English right:
"[I]n all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right...
to be allowed counsel."23 Judge Alfred S. Niles says that
Art. XXI "is very similar both in language and effect to the
Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."24 Professor
Beaney, however, argues that the colonies generally made
only technical improvements on the English law. 5 This is
not the view expressed in Powell v. Alabama.2 6
With respect to the Federal Constitution and the colonial
improvement over the English law, Story says that the
Sixth Amendment creates as a "matter of constitutional
137 & 8 W. III, c. 3, s. 1 (1695).
1"20 Geo. II, c. 30 (1747).
" 6 & 7 Will. IV, c. 114, s. 1 (186).
:13 Edw. VII, c. 38, s. 1 (1903).
1720 & 21 Geo. V, c.32 (1930).

"812 & 13 Geo. VI, c. 51 (1949).
" BANEY, op. cit. supra,n. 11, 18.
20 Ibid.
21 B-NEY, op. cit. supra, n. 11, 19.
2 Pt. I, Art. XII, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
"Declaration of Rights, Art. XXI.
I NILsE, MAR7LAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

BRANEY, op. cit. 8upra, n. 11, 22.

'287

U.S. 45, 64-5 (1932).

(1915)

41.
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right what the common law had left in a most imperfect
and questionable state,' 27 and Cooley writes:
"With us, it is a universal principle of constitutional
law, that the prisoner shall be allowed a defense by
counsel. And generally, it will be found that the humanity of the law has provided that, if the prisoner is
unable to employ counsel, the court may designate
some one to '2defend him, who shall be paid by the
government.
In point of time, the Sixth Amendment was preceded
by the Judiciary Act of 1789, providing an apparent right
to be represented by privately-employed counsel in "all
courts of the United States"2 9 and by a later statute, granting the right to receive court-appointedcounsel in cases of
treason or other capital crime." Moreover, the general
practice of United States District Courts was to appoint
counsel in less than capital cases;3 but, it was not the concensus before 1938 that defendants in non-capital cases who
failed to request counsel had a constitutional right to courtappointed counsel or that a conviction without counsel was
voidable.2 However, in 1938, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 3 created a constitutional requirement of what
had been practice and custom in the United States courts,
stating that the Sixth Amendment invalidates a conviction
of an accused who was not represented by counsel at every
stage of the trial unless the defendant has intelligently
waived the assistance of counsel.
In reaching its decision in Johnson, the Court avoided
an historical consideration of the right to counsel because
there appeared to be no decisional precedents squarely on
point. It is unclear why the Court ignored the statutes
enacted immediately prior to the ratification of the Sixth
Amendment in 1791 and the practice of lower courts over
the years. The Court may simply have elected "to adopt a
more enlightened procedure because modern conditions
and attitudes seemed to make such action desirable. ' 34
Whatever the basis for the opinion, it could have been
II STORY, Op. cit. supra, n. 9, 551.
I COOLLY, op. cit. supra, n. 6,406.
211 Stat. 73, sec. 35 (1789) ; BEANEY, op. cit. supra, n. 11, 28 and 32 discusses the ambiguity of the background of this conclusion.
I1 Stat. 118 (1790).
31BEANEY, op. cit. supra, n. 11, 29.
2 BEANEY, op. cit. supra, n. 11, 32.
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
31Supra n. 33, 463; BEANEY, op. cit. supra, n. 11, 44; KAUPER, FRoNTIERS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LiBERTY (U. Mich. Press, 1956) 42, 43.
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predicated on two grounds: (1) the historical, with its
liberalized standards of fair judicial procedure, and (2) an
outright humanitarian policy decision supported by dicta
in Patton v. U.S.33 and Powell v. Alabama.36 The possibility
of a dual approach in establishing a constitutional right for
federal defendants has been invoked for many years in
attempts to establish a similarly broad right for state defendants under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 1 With Gideon, those efforts became successful.
III. UNDER THE CONSTrTTON

Prior to Gideon, the right to court-appointed counsel
under the Sixth Amendment had been considerably broader
than under the due process clause of the Fourteenth. The
explanation for this dichotomy is found in evolving constructions of due process, in interpretation of constitutional
language, and in the maintenance of a satisfactory balance
of state and national power within a federal system.
Powell is, for all intents and purposes, the fons et origio
of the law of right to counsel of one's own choosing and,
arguably, of the right to court-appointed counsel. On its
face, it held that the defendants were entitled to secure
counsel of their own choice and to have adequate time to
advise with counsel and to prepare their defenses. But the
opinion added a second leg to its holding, to which some
members of the Court objected as unessential to the decision of the case and hence as not proper matter for ruling
at that time, and which is the basis of the argument that
Powell created a right to court-appointed counsel:
"[T]hat in a capital case, where the defendant is unable
to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested to or not, to assign counsel
for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law;
and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at
such time or under such circumstances as to preclude
the giving of'38effective aid in the preparation and trial
of the case.
281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930).
Supra, n. 3, 68-9 (1932).
17 Supra, n. 2, 474, and Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649 (1948).
See also
Holtzoff, Right to Counsel Under the Siwth Amendment, 20 N.Y.L.Q. 1
(1944).
-287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
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Powell and its subsequent interpretations established
the absolute right to have and secure counsel of one's own
9 the
choice. In Chandler v. Fretag,8
defendant, charged
with housebreaking and larceny, was informed at his trial
that, because of three prior felony convictions, he would
be tried as an habitual criminal, and, if convicted, would
face possible life imprisonment. His request for a continuance to permit him an opportunity to obtain counsel was
denied. On certiorari the Court stated: "Regardless of
whether petitioner would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel, his right to be heard through his own counsel was unqualified.""0 In Chandler,the Court quoted from
Powell: "What, then, does a hearing include? Historically
and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always
included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and
provided by the party asserting the right."41 In a later case,
where the defendant objected to being tried when his privately-retained counsel was absent, and his request for a
continuance was denied, the Court held that there "was a
denial of petitioner's constitutional right to a fair trial,
with the aid and assistance of counsel whom he had retained. 4' 2 In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has stated
the rule: "Every citizen is entitled to employ counsel when
put upon trial for a criminal offense." 43 Any interference
with that right by state officials constitutes a denial of due
process."
There also was created as an outgrowth of Powell an
absolute right to have sufficient opportunity to prepare for
trial and to obtain a reasonable continuance until counsel
is ready to proceed. In Powell, the Court stated: "The
prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended
and encouraged. But in reaching that result a defendant,
charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his
right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense."4 5 Although the denial of a continuance,
standing alone, does not violate due process," the Court
- 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
'0 Id., 9.
1Ibid.
"2House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42,46 (1945).
" Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 608, 56 A. 2d 818 (1948) ; MD. Rurx 719 c,
amended, Daily Record, August 9, 1963. See also Chewning v. Cunningham,
368 U.S. 443 (1962); Reickauer v. Cunningham, 299 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.
1962). Cf. Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950), Wade v. Mayo, 334
U.S. 672 (1948), Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), and Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
" McCleary v. State, 122 Md. 394, 400, 89 A. 2d 1100 (1914).
"Supra, n. 38, 59.

"Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).

338
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will not condone proceedings which deprive a defendant
of the effective assistance of counsel, as where the defendant in a murder case is allowed to see only the Public Defender for 15 minutes late the night before his trial and
where his request for a 24-hour continuance is denied although it would have enabled him to examine the indictment, consult with the assistant Public Defender assigned
to represent him, subpoena witnesses and otherwise prepare his defense.47 But there is no hard and fast rule to
guide lower courts as to when or under what circumstances
to grant or deny a continuance. In Maryland, Judge Grason
stated the rule:
"Counsel appointed to defend one charged with crime
must be given a reasonable time to prepare his client's
case for trial. It would be a great injustice to the accused to appoint counsel for him and immediately put
the accused upon trial without an opportunity
to the
4
counsel to thoroughly investigate the case."
However, there still is uncertainty as to the stage at
which the right to counsel of one's own choosing or, in fact,
by court appointment, attaches, but a discussion of this
point is reserved for later.
Powell was significant in several respects. It rested upon
an historical consideration of the right to counsel as one
test to determine whether due process of law has been met,
subject to the qualification that "the settled usages and
modes of proceeding under the common and statute law of
England before the Declaration of Independence . . . be
shown not to have been unsuited to the civil and political
conditions of our ancestors by having been followed in this
country after it became a nation."4 9 Applying this test, the
Court concluded that the right to counsel at common law
could be maintained as necessary to due process only with
great difficulty.50
Further, Powell marked a repudiation of the doctrine of
Hurtado v. California,5 i.e. that, as the Powell opinion put
it,
"... in the sense of the Constitution due process of
law was not intended to include, ex vi termini, the in" Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945). See also House v. Mayo, 324 U.S.
42 (1945) ; cf. White v. Ragan, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
41 Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 608-9, 56 A. 2d 818 (1948) ; see also Harmon
v. State, 227 Md. 602, 177 A. 2d 902 (1962) ; and Taylor v. State, 226 Md.
561, 174 A. 2d 573 (1961).
4 Supra, n. 38, 65.
0Supra, n. 38.
'110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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stitution and procedure of a grand jury in any case;
and that the same phrase, employed in the Fourteenth
Amendment to restrain the action of the states, was to
be interpreted as having been used in the same sense
and with no greater extent; and that if it had been the
purpose of that Amendment to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in the states, it would have
embodied, as did the Fifth Amendment, an express
declaration to that effect." 2
This construction-that no language in the Constitution is
meaningless-presented a barrier to the holding that due
process had been violated in the Powell case, but it was
overcome by the Court's statement that Hurtado merely
set out a rule of construction which must give way when
its application would violate fundamental principles of
justice.5 3 Powell predicated due process with respect to the
right to counsel not on the fact that the Sixth Amendment
says that counsel is required in all criminal cases in Federal courts, but on the fact that the right is of such a "fundamental character,

'54

that the necessity of counsel was so

vital under all the circumstances of the case that the trial
court's failure to make an effective appointment of counsel
constituted such a denial of the basic sense of justice and
fair play as to be a denial of due process. Powell thus
created a conceptual basis for Fourteenth Amendment absorption, founded upon the nature of the right to counsel
under all the circumstances of the case. In Gideon55 the
Court interpreted Powell as protecting the right to counsel
in all cases because the right is "fundamental."
Finally, in Powell, judicial empiricism was exercised to
recognize and safeguard rights which were deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and to condemn the
blind reapplication of common law procedures which stultify progressive change and development. But, as will be
shown below, later interpretations indicated that the Court
also would strive to maintain state legislative and judicial
autonomy, subject to a flexible conceptual due process
limitation and case-by-case establishment of minimal standards of justice. Gideon has the effect of dispelling any possibility for balancing in this area by establishing an absolute
right to counsel in certainly every serious, and perhaps
2 Supra, n. 38, 66.
- Id., 67.
'AId., 68. See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; Hebert v.
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
-372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
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even in all, criminal proceedings, unless the right is intelligently waived.56
The previous need for balancing or weighing in each
non-capital case arose from the fact that after several narrow constructions of Powell,7 the Court in Betts v. Brady
rejected an argument that due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment required the appointment of counsel for indigent state defendants in non-capital cases, finding that
historical considerations compelled the conclusion that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential
to a fair trial,""8 but recognizing, consistent with the doc5 9 that "in certain circumtrine of Palko v. Connecticut,
stances or in connection with other elements" the lack of
counsel in a non-capital case "may result in a conviction
lacking in such fundamental fairness ' as to violate due
process. In dissent, Justices Black, Murphy and Douglas
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to the states." In Betts, the Justices divided between the balancing approach, requiring a case-by-case analysis, and the absolutist approach, advocating total absorption of the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth.62
The Court has remained divided ever since, but the division
in approach to the problem has not prevented it from finding the crucial element of unfairness in many pre-Gideon
right to counsel cases.6 Even in Gideon, Justice Harlan
emphasized the persistent division in approach, stating that
the holding that a right valid against the Federal government is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and
thus valid against the states should not be read "to suggest
that by so holding, we [the Court] automatically carry over
an entire body
of federal law and apply it in full sweep to
' 64
the States.
0 Id., 346, 352, indicating that Justices Douglas and Harlan will continue
to maintain different views of the effects of Gideon and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
BEAINEY, op. Cit. supra, n. 11, 157.
"316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
"302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Supra, n. 58, 473.

SlId., 474.

See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut,

supra, n. 59; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
"Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950) ; Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S.
728 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332
U.S. 134 (1947).
-372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963).
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IV. CRITICISM OF THE

FAIR TRIAL RULE

Historical considerations aside, Betts had been the cause
of much criticism 65 and was implicitly criticized in Gideon
as watering down Powell and Grossjean v. American
Press, 66 where, speaking of its decision in Powell, the Court
stated:
"We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal
action, were also safeguarded against state action by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and among them the fundamental right of the accused
to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution."6 7
It is not altogether ancillary to note the vagueness of "the
aid of counsel" and to wonder whether counsel of one's own
choice or of court-appointment is meant.
Although the rule in Johnson v. Zerbst, that the right
to counsel in all criminal matters in federal courts is an
absolute right, had provided an argument by analogy for
an identical rule applicable to the states, the argument had
not been adopted until Gideon. Johnson also had been
grounds for argument that there existed an unconscionable
double standard, one rule obtaining in federal courts and
another in state courts, and that the Court should not sanction the duality but avoid needless conflict between the
federal and state governments s by overruling Betts or
otherwise creating a rule for state courts analogous to the
federal rule. Justice Harlan's opinion in Gideon shows the
impact of the argument: "To continue a rule which is honored by this Court only with lip service is not a healthy
thing and in the long run will do disservice to the federal
system." 9 It also reflects his adherence to maintaining
clear lines of distinction between the state and federal
governments and justifies his concurrence in Gideon.
The argument against a double standard was complemented by an argument that many of the states by statute
or by rule of court or in practice had abandoned Betts. In
Gideon, the Court agreed that Betts was an "anachronism"
when decided, 70 and in his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted the substantial and steady erosion of Betts.71 By
O'Note, 21 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 107 (1942); Note, 16 So. Cal. L. Rev. 55
(1942) ; Note, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 306 (1942).
'297 U.S. 233 (1936).
-Id., 2434.
"Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960).
"372 U.S. 335, 357 (1963) ; see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
'DId., 345.
Id., 349.
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the same token, twenty-two states, as amici curiae in
Gideon, urged the Court to overrule Betts on the ground
that the Court ought to conclude, as it did in Mapp v. Ohio,7 2
that the laws and practice of the states and of England
justify its abandoning an archaic rule.
It also had been pointed out that the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments make no distinction between the loss of life and liberty and that the Court's
differentiation of cases on that basis was not supported by
constitutional language, practical considerations or logic.73
Only Justice Clark adopted this criticism in his concurring
opinion in Gideon: "The Court's decision today, then, does
no more than erase a distinction which has no basis in
logic and an increasingly eroded basis in authority."7 4 Even
before Justice Clark had sanctioned the criticism, Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Bute v. Illinois,7 5 indicated that the
crucial question is the need for legal assistance, not the
nature of the charge or the ability of the lay defendant to
defend himself. In recent years, moreover, the Court, by
dicta, had tended to abolish the capital-non-capital dis6 it noted the disparity of
tinction. In Griffin v. Illinois,7
treatment of capital and non-capital cases in a statute providing for free trial transcripts only for indigents sentenced
to death. In Kinsella v. Singleton,77 the Court stated that
court-martial jurisdiction over non-military dependents at
American military bases in foreign countries cannot be
made to depend on whether the offense charged is capital or
non-capital. Finally, in Ferguson v. Georgia,7s a capital
case involving an evidentiary rule that a person charged
with a criminal offense is incompetent to testify in his own
behalf but may give a statement in his behalf, the Court
held it to be a denial of due process to deny the defendant
the right to have his counsel question him to elicit the permissible statement, but it added significant dicta indicating
the capital-non-capital distinction in Betts was becoming
unacceptable.
The theory that the trial court would protect the defendant's rights where no counsel was present was promi-2367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"3Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948) ;see also Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961) and Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
-'372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963).
1333 U.S. 640, 677 et. seq. (1948) : Note, 4 Wayne L. Rev. 191 (1958)
Fellman, The Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 Neb. L. Rev. 15, 25
(1951).
76351 U.S. 12, 14 (1956).
-361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).
-83&5 U.S. 570, 596 (1961).
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nent in Powell7 9 and Betts. ° More recently, in Gibbs v.
Burke, the Court commented:
"[Tlhe fair conduct of a trial depends largely on the
wisdom and understanding of the trial judge. He knows
the essentials of a fair trial. The primary duty falls on
him to determine the accused's need of counsel at
arraignment and during trial. He may guide a defendant without a lawyer past the errors that make
trials unfair."'"
But the Court found that Gibbs' trial lacked fundamental
fairness because neither counsel nor adequate judicial guidance or protection was afforded, predicating its finding on
the grounds that the admission of incompetent testimony
and the exclusion from evidence of relevant defense evidence were matters to which counsel, but not a layman,
could have been expected to object or except.
As the Court implied in Gibbs and as it indicates in
Gideon,82 there are eminently practical reasons why an indigent defendant needs the advice and assistance of counsel.
He cannot be expected to evaluate the lawfulness of his
arrest, seizure or search; the validity of the indictment;
what preliminary motions to file; whether his confession is
considered voluntary and admissible; whether he is responsible for the crime charged or for a different one; whether
he should plead guilty to a lesser offense; whether he should
pray a jury trial and what questions to submit on voir dire;
whether he should object to certain evidence; whether he
should cross-examine and if so to what extent and how.
While in jail awaiting trail, the indigent defendant is unable to prepare his defense, and after conviction, the layman is unsophisticated in the sentencing procedure or the
methods for appealing. His ignorance of the law is not
counter-balanced by his native ability to such a degree as
to justify matching him against the state's prosecutor and
investigative agencies.8 3 These same arguments may justify
extending Gideon to cases where the sanction for the
offense charged is less than a substantial prison sentence,
such as a misdemeanor or all crimes within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Baltimore City, for
example.
79287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).

80316 U.S. 455, 472 (1945).
81337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949); see also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962) ; McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) ; Hudson v. North Carolina,
363 U.S. 697 (1960).
s'372 U.S. 335, 344 (19M).
s The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 135-6 (1949).
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On strictly constitutional grounds, it had been urged
that Betts denied equal protection of the law by distinguishing between those defendants who are financially able to
obtain counsel and those who are indigent in instances
where those able and unable to retain counsel are charged
with the same, less-than-capital crime. Justice Douglas
long had been of the opinion that Betts should have been
overruled because of the burdens
it placed on an accused
"solely because of his poverty." 4 In Griffin v. Illinois,"
5 the
Court itself condemned the denial of equal opportunity for
appellate review,86 and in strong dicta indicated the right
to counsel is likewise covered by the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 7 In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board,8 the Court held unconstitutional as violating Fourteenth Amendment due process a state statute8 9
under which a trial court was empowered with discretion
to grant or deny an indigent defendant's request for a free
transcript of trial for a non-capital offense. Gideon, however, is devoid of any consideration of the equal protection
argument.
V. WHEN THE RIGHT ATTACHES

In Powell, the Court found one of the crucial facts to
be that the trial court did not designate counsel for the
time after arraignment and before trial, the implication
being that the right attaches at least at arraignment. This
would be true whether Powell is read as holding only that
a defendant has an absolute right to counsel of his own
choice or as holding that due process was violated by the
failure to appoint counsel. But at what point prior to the
pretrial stage does the right attach? Gideon gives no indication, but the answer may well depend on how soon after
arrest the accused is given a preliminary hearing or a formal arraignment, what prejudice to his subsequent trial
may arise during the pre-hearing period,"' and whether he
is able and indicates a desire to hire his own counsel immediately after his arrest.
The overriding criterion for finding a violation of due
9 2 and
process was established in Crooker v. California,
McNeal v. Culver, supra, n. 81, 118-9.
8351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, sec. 769.1.
87 Supra, n. 85, 17-18.
357 U.S. 214 (1958); see also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487
(1963) ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
'*Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. (1932) eec. 42-5.
a287
U.S. 45, 52-53 (1932).
91
Canizio v. People, 327 U.S. 82 (1946); see also Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85 (1955).
82357 U.S. 433 (1958).
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Ciceniav. LaGay.9 In both cases, the accused had indicated
a desire to contact counsel of his own choice; in Crooker,
the accused was a former law student who was able to
retain counsel and who requested the right to do so, and, in
Cicenia,the accused already had retained counsel but was
not permitted to contact him during police interrogation.
In both cases, the confessions were held admissible. In the
Court's view of these cases, however, the test for finding a
violation of due process was stated to be whether the lack
of counsel at that particular stage was so prejudicial as to
infect the subsequent trial "with an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice'."9 4
In those cases, such a determination depended upon "all
the circumstances of the case,'"" especially whether a coerced confession was obtained while the police held the
accused and he was denied his request to be permitted to
obtain counsel prior to making any statements." In neither
case was the confession proved coerced. Whether Crooker
and Cicenia will be limited to their exact factual circumstances-where the accused wished to contact his own counsel-or will be blended with cases where the accused requests counsel be appointed for him during the pre-hearing
stage, is open to wide speculation, but there is ample room
for predicting that such blending could well take place, if
the Gideon interpretation of Powell is to be followed.
On the other hand, the Court has been reluctant to defeat valid police purposes and methods by creating a rule
which would vitiate any conviction of a defendant whose
request for counsel, made while he was in police custody
prior to a preliminary hearing, was denied, regardless of
any consequences to the accused arising from such a denial.9 The Court has not imposed on the states the McNabbMallory rule,98 applicable to federal officers, that the person
arrested without a warrant must be taken to a magistrate
without unnecessary delay, at which time a complaint shall
be filed. The argument for the imposition of the Mallory
rule apparently has been that the rule has been the only
real deterrence to unsanctionable police activity and
'357 U.S. 504 (1958).
Supra, n. 92, and id.
"Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948) and House v. Mayo, 324
U.S. 42 (1945).
mCulombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961); Crooker v. California, supra, n. 92, 440; Cicenia v. LaGay,
supra, n. 93; Miller v. State, 231 Md. 158, 189 A. 2d 118 (1963).
" Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, n. 96, and Crooker v. California, 8upra,
n. 92. 440-1.
"Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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methods, but the Court has not extended Mallory's rationale to the problems of right to counsel.9 9 In addition, the
Court (in recent years by a bare majority) has rested its
reluctance to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle
for supervising state administration of criminal law on an
elastic concept of due process, defined with reference to
the practice of the states and other countries in matters
pertaining to police investigation and the rights of the accused.' 0 However, Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Douglas, Black and Brennan have argued that, in the words
of Justice Douglas, in Culombe v. Connecticut, "any accused-whether rich or poor-has the right to consult a
lawyer before talking with the police; and if he makes the
request for a lawyer and it is refused, he is denied 'the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense' guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments."'0 1 The case then before Justice Douglas, in which he filed a concurring opinion,
involved an illiterate mental defective of the moron class
who had requested counsel throughout his detention and
interrogation of several days, but whose request had been
denied, and who had been told only that he could have a
lawyer if he knew of one to contact, which he did not.
Moreover, the police made no effort to contact even the
Public Defender, much less inform Culombe of the fact
that the State maintained an office of a Public Defender.
Whether Justice Douglas' broad statement, inclusive of
"any accused-whether rich or poor-", is to be taken as
limited to the facts of Culombe is doubtful when read with
subsequent language in his concurring opinion. It is precisely the breadth of language in this part of the Culombe
opinion which leads to subsequent blending of dicta and
holding in the areas of right to counsel of one's own
choosing and right to counsel by court appointment.
Douglas' view underlies Spano v. New York,10 2 where
it was held that the admission of an involuntary post-indictment confession made in the absence of counsel violates
due process. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the
argument that Crooker and Cicenia were inapplicable because no indictment had been returned, as in Spano, and
that the Court therefore should adopt the rule that "followMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), provides the basis for the argument.
Iw0Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
101Supra, n. 100, 637; see also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324
(1959) ; Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958) ; Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958) ; Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 431 (1958). This
is not the same, but a supplementary, view urged by Justice Douglas in
Reck v. Pate, supra, n. 96, 447.
10 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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ing indictment no confession obtained in the absence of
counsel can be used without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 10 3 However, Justices Douglas, Black and
Brennan stated that the post-indictment interrogation and
confession in the absence of counsel deprived the accused
04
of his right to counsel, contrary to the dicta in Powell.
Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Douglas and Brennan
concurred, joined in the Court's opinion, stating: "It is my
view that the absence of counsel when this confession was
elicited was alone enough to render it inadmissible under
the Fourteenth Amendment."' 0 5
These same Justices recently succeeded in overthrowing
a conviction where the accused, without counsel, could have
been prejudiced by his actions during arraignment. In
Hamilton v. Alabama,0 6 a unanimous Court reversed the
conviction of a defendant in a capital case where the accused was denied counsel at the arraignment and where
arraignment was found to be a critical stage in the entire
proceedings where "what happens there may affect the
whole trial."'0 7 Hamilton stands in contrast to Spano,
where actual prejudice, not potential prejudice, was controlling. The Court stated in Hamilton that the admissibility of a confession was not involved and it specifically
rejected the "resulting prejudice" theory of Crooker and
Cicenia. Combining Spano and Hamilton the Court finds
a violation of due process under the theory of potential,
rather than actual, prejudice.""
Hamilton has particular importance to Maryland because of the Supreme Court's reversal of White v. State,0 9
where the Maryland Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of the accused in a capital case where at trial the
"guilty" plea of the defendant, made before a magistrate
and in the absence of counsel, was admitted into evidence
although the defendant, at his subsequent arraignment and
trial, pleaded not guilty upon the advice of counsel. In
White, the Maryland Court had stated that the defendant
was not denied due process by the absence of counsel at the
preliminary hearing, and had distinguished Hamilton as
resting on the fact that although arraignment was a critical
stage in Alabama, it was not critical in Maryland because,
- Id., 320.
10,Plowell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
105 Spano v. New York, supra, n. 101, 326.
10368 U.S. 52 (1961).
10
Id., 54 (emphasis added).
10 8
Supra, n. 106. See also Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962)
and Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
"0227 Md. 615, 177 A. 2d 177 (1962), rev'd per curiam, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
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at trial, a waiver of various motions available at arraignment could be cured and the plea entered at arraignment
changed. The Court also had stated that, although evidence
of the original plea is admissible, the admission of such
evidence did not prejudice White. The Court did not find
it necessary to consider the statement in Hamilton that
where the arraignment is a critical stage the defendant
need not later plead or prove prejudice to reverse a conviction, since the degree of prejudice from the lack of
counsel is not determinable. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that, in a capital case, where the defendant entered
a guilty plea before a magistrate when he had no counsel,
the preliminary hearing in those circumstances becomes a
critical stage at which the defendant has a right to counsel.
The holding rests on the facts that the plea entered before
the magistrate was admitted at the actual trial and that it
becomes purely speculative whether any prejudice resulted
from the admission of the plea. That White's co-defendant
was not sentenced to death may have been an underlying
motive for the Court to reverse. There was no finding that
in other cases the preliminary hearing in Maryland would
become a critical stage, but, reading White and Gideon together, it could be interpreted as a stage at which counsel
is required.
VI. THE RIGHT IN MARYLAND--THE SUPP,MXE COURT
AND THE STATE COURT

Unfortunately, Gideon leaves some crucial problems unanswered, including the question whether it will be applied
retroactively, but it can be inferred from some of its language and from a recent remand of a Maryland case that it
could be so applied.1 ' In view of the confusion generated
by Mapp, it is an unsatisfactory opinion on this point.
It is also not clear from the opinion in Gideon whether,
as Justice Harlan indicates, the states will be required to
appoint counsel only in cases where there is a possibility of
a "substantial prison sentence""' or whether they will be
required to appoint counsel in all cases, regardless of the
sanctions attached to the offense charged.
With respect to the pre-arraignment stage in Maryland,
it is the rule that due process is not violated when the den°;Patterson v. State, 227 Md. 194, 175 A. 2d 746, rev'd in light of Gideon,
372 U.S. 776 (1963). Cf. Lumpkin v. Director, Daily Record, July 13, 1963;
Thompson v. Warden, Daily Record, July 12, 1963; Wilson v. Warden,
Daily Record, May 25, 1963; and In Re Manning Daily Record, May 14,
1963.
"'372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963).

1963]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

fendant, whose counsel is not present or whose request for
counsel has been denied, makes a voluntary confession during police investigation but before arraignment.1 1 2 Similarly, counsel need not be appointed for the magistrate's
hearing and the absence of retained counsel at that hearing
is not a violation of due process. 113 However, the arraigning
judge must advise the defendant of his right to counsel and
compliance with the duty is obligatory." 4
Prior to Gideon, where an offense carried maximum
punishments of death or imprisonment for five years or
more, a Maryland Court was duty-bound to assign counsel," although this rule has recently been amended. But
the trial court could assign counsel in any other case,"'
taking into consideration the complexity of the case, the
youth, inexperience and mental ability of the accused." 7
Where a defendant was tried without counsel and there
was such an absence of fairness as to deny the essentials of
justice, the Court of Appeals had been loathe to sustain a
conviction."18 Due process still may be violated as a result
of such inadequate representation as to be, in effect, no
representation at all." 9
Under present Maryland law, the defendant either may
waive his right to court-appointed counsel, 12 0 or by entering
a guilty plea, he may forego the right,' 2 ' or where he is
experienced because of former trials in the criminal courts
and he does not request counsel, he may likewise waive
his right. 22 Moreover, the trial court's failure to appoint
counsel, though not requested to do so, and to ask whether
the defendant wishes to have counsel assigned to represent
him, does not ipso facto become a denial of due process. 23
Gideon makes no reference to the problems of waiver because both Betts and Gideon requested counsel, and it is
"I Lenoir v. State, 197 Md. 495, 80 A. 2d 3 (1951) and Day v. State, 196
Md. 384, 76 A. 2d 729 (1950).
m Nettles v. Warden, 215 Md. 659, 139 A. 2d 242 (1958), but see szipra,
n. 109.
nMerritt
v. State, 221 Md. 118, 156 A. 2d 228 (1959) ; Williams v. State,
220 Md. 180, 151 A. 2d 271 (1959); Hill v. State, 218 Md. 120, 145 A. 2(1

445 (1958).

" MD. RuLE 719 b 2 (a) and amendment, Daily Record, August 9, 1963.
nOMD. RULE 719 b 2 (b) and amendment, Daily Record August 9, 1963.
"1 Sears v. Superintendent, 202 Md. 656, 97 A. 2d 133 (1953).
m1The cases are collected in 5 M.L.E., sec. 289.
m Hall v. Warden, 224 Md. 662, 168 A. 2d 373 (1961), 201 F. Supp. 639,
313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir., 1963) and 31 L. W. 3405 (1963) ; Hardesty v. State,
223 Md. 559, 165 A. 2d 761 (1960) ; WoodelI v. State, 223 Md. &9, 162 A. 2d

468 (1960).

"Meekins v. Warden, 203 Md. 655, 99 A. 21 724 (1953) and MD. RuT.z
719, Daily Record, August 9, 1963.
In Parker v. Warden, 222 Md. 598, 158 A. 21 762 (1960).
'=Wilson v. Warden, 209 Md. 659, 121 A. 2d 695 (1956).
I" Jewett v. State, 190 Md. 289, 58 A. 2d 236 (1948).
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uncertain whether the case will have any effect on the
problems involved in the theory of waiver.
Just as Gideon does not specify when the right attaches,
it is barren of advice when the right terminates. In Maryland, the trial court is under no obligation to inform the
defendant of his right to appeal,12 4 and counsel's duty terminates upon the imposition of a sentence, although he is
authorized to note, but need not perfect, an appeal, if directed by the accused to do so.12 But he has no duty to
advise the defendant of the right of appeal. It would seem
to be the better rule that the duration of representation
should begin at such time after arrest that the police could
pursue their goals without violating defendants' rights, but
not so late that the defendant might be denied his rights,
and that it should extend through the 30-day period in
which an appeal can be noted, for the reason that the indigent and untutored defendant may lose many of his rights
to subsequently attack the judgment if he fails to enter a
timely appeal. In the time before arraignment and after
judgment of conviction, the need for counsel to preserve the
accused's rights is no less necessary than at trial, for whenever there is a possibility that a person's rights unwittingly
and unwillingly may be lost or otherwise violated, there is
a countervailing need for representation. This need was
2 6 where the
implicitly recognized in Douglas v. California'
Court held unconstitutional as against the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state statute which
provided that state appellate courts, upon the request of an
indigent defendant for counsel, should appoint counsel if
in the opinion of the court it would be helpful either to the
127
court or to the defendant, citing Draper v. Washington,
where a statute granting the right to a free transcript was
based upon the trial court's discretion and held to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment.
It would serve no useful purpose to delineate those instances where the Supreme Court found that the absence
of counsel deprived the trial of fundamental fairness; in
those cases, the basic issue was whether the type of case or
the individual defendant, or both together, required, by
their very nature, that counsel be appointed to represent
the accused. Yet it still remains remarkable that the Court
could have so long tolerated a rule so unwieldy and difficult
to administer as Betts had been.
Rayne v. Warden, 223 Md. 688, 165 A. 2d 474 (1960).
MD. RULE 719 b 4 and Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
'372 U.S. 353 (1963).
1372 U.S. 487 (1963).
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VII. FEDERALISM

The problems inherent in Betts fundamentally were
problems in Federalism. The same problems persist in
Gideon. They concern the relation of the Supreme Court
to the states, and the reaction of the Supreme Court, traditionally sensitive to maintaining an acceptable balance
of powers between the federal government and the states,
to the conflict between principles of individual rights and
the expedient administration of the criminal law.
Only twice in Gideon are problems of federalism directly considered. Justice Harlan openly maintains the
position that an "entire body of federal law" is not applied
in "full sweep to the states" by Gideon and that there is no
wholesale "incorporation" of the Sixth Amendment into
the Fourteenth.12 However, he justifies the application of
the Sixth to the states on the ground that Betts would do
a disservice to the federal system if the Court continued to
pay it lip-service only. Justice Black merely enumerates
those provisions of the first eight amendments which have
been made obligatory on the states.'2 9 In this argument by
analogy, he stops short of advocating that the Bill of Rights
has been or should be absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment, although he implicitly contends the same. 30 Justice
Black's retreat from his usual position perhaps can be explained by the fact that a unanimous Court could be persuaded to overrule Betts only if Justice Black modified his
usual language of incorporation.
Between these poles of thought there has long been
waged a debate as to what Fourteenth Amendment due
process requires of the states. There had been a time when
the Court had permitted the administration of the criminal
laws to be left largely to the states.1"3' Yet despite its historical reluctance to use the Fourteenth as a vehicle to extensively limit state authority, the Court in Gideon again
exercised its contemporary role of setting at least minimum
standards of criminal law on a national scale,'3 2 justifying
-372
(1963).

U.S. 335, 372 (1963) and Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23

Id., 34142.
oId.

'Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168-69 (1952). See also Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); KAupPE, FRONnres OF
CoNsTrrTIoNAL LIBERTY (U. Mich. Press, 1956) 154, 159-60.
Exemplifying this approach are: Mapp v. Ohio, id.; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and
Draper v. Washington, supra, n. 127; Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) ;
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261
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its position on the broad ground that it was recognizing and
safeguarding still another fundamental right. In fact, as
Gideon illustrates, the recognition of a fundamental right
is largely an empiric, flexible and eclectic process which
allows leeway for judicial creativity and is exercised with
reference to such expansive concepts as the community's
sense of decency, civilized standards of decency, or the
essence of what is implicit in a scheme of ordered liberty,
that is, with reference to those standards which constitute
due process. As due process is thus broadly defined, the
Court is afforded greater room in which to exercise its judicial discretion.
There have been two results of this flexible agreement
to protect fundamental rights. On the one hand, some Justices have argued that the Bill of Rights is not absorbed
into the Fourteenth Amendment. The natural result of
non-absorption is to impose less rigid standards on the
states, permit them opportunities to experiment with their
criminal law procedures and leave to them the primary
responsibility for administering the criminal law. By this
doctrine, certain safeguards of the first eight amendments
have been excluded from the Fourteenth. 3 '
On the other hand, Justices Black and Douglas have
argued"" that the first eight amendments are absorbed into
the Fourteenth, and Justices Murphy and Rutledge had
contended" 8" that the Fourteenth guarantees not only what
is secured by the first eight, but also whatever else may be
required to protect a defendant's rights. Where either view
has prevailed, rights guaranteed to state-court defendants
have been established on a national level; the concept of
"fundamental right" has been engrafted upon them; and
the federal judiciary has enlarged its supervisory role over
the states.
By piecemeal victories over the years, those Justices
who have advocated either version of absorption have put
aside Hurtado's doctrine. They have caused a major expansion in the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's due
(1947) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) ; and Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
18 Exemplifying this approach are: Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) ; Hurdato v. California.
8upra, n. 131; see also Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961) and
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
I' See Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 8upra, n. 133,
and in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
I" See dissents of Justices Murphy and Rutledge, in Bute v. Illinois, 353
U.S. 640 (1948), adopting dissent of Justice Douglas therein. See also
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
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process clause, and they have succeeded in narrowing the
ambit of the states to administer their criminal procedures.
In these respects, those "liberal" activist Justices do not
appear to be out-of-step with the political processes of contemporary federalism, which no longer permits abuses of
defendants' rights which formerly had been condoned in
the name of state administration of the criminal law, in the
name of an older version of federalism.
Depreciation Of Tenant-Erected Building By
Purchaser Of Fee
World PublishingCo. v. Commissionerof InternalRevenue'
Pursuant to the terms of a fifty year lease of realty, the
lessee erected a six story building at a cost of more than
$250,000. The lease provided that at its expiration all
buildings and improvements put upon the land by the
lessee were to pass to the lessor. Subsequently, the lessor
sold his entire interest in the property to the petitioner.
After the petitioner purchased the lessor's interest, he
began claiming a deduction for depreciation of the building
by writing off, over the remaining twenty eight years of
the lease, that portion of the purchase price applicable to
the building.2 The depreciation deductions claimed by the
taxpayer were disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and this ruling was upheld by the Tax Court.3
The Tax Court concluded that depreciation 4 was not allowable in this instance since the petitioner's interest in the
building was such that he would not suffer an economic
loss by its physical exhaustion. On appeal the Circuit Court
reversed the Tax Court decision. It held that the taxpayer
could write off that portion of the purchase price allocable
to the tenant erected building by periodic depreciation deductions. The Court pointed out a number of cases that
have denied depreciation on the tenant built improvement
where the taxpayer acquired the fee interest by devise or
inheritance, but distinguished those cases from an acquisition by purchase.5
'299
F. 2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
2
Petitioner paid $700,000 for the property. The land was appraised at
$400,000 and the building at $300,000. The rent over the fifty year lease
averaged
$28,500 per year.
8
35 T.C. 7 (1961).
'26 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) § 167(a). The 1954 Code is referred to
throughout the note since sections of the 1939 Code applicable to discussion
were not materially changed by the 1954 Code.
' Supra, n. 1, 618-621.

